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THE CASE FOR OVERSEAS ARTICLE III COURTS: THE
BLACKWATER EFFECT AND CRIMINAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN
THE AGE OF PRIVATIZATION
Alan F. Williams*
INTRODUCTION
A series of high-profile cases involving the alleged murders of
Iraqi civilians by U.S. contractors operating overseas has highlight-
ed the longstanding problem of how best to address crimes
committed overseas by civilian employees, dependents, or contrac-
tors of the U.S. government. Among the most notorious of these
incidents is the alleged killing of seventeen Iraqi civilians in Nisour
Square in Baghdad on September 16, 2007 by employees of Black-
water Worldwide,' a private corporation specializing in military
operations that has subsequently renamed itself "Xe."2 News re-
ports of this incident prompted embarrassment and outrage as
many Americans learned that U.S. civilian contractors like the
Blackwater/Xe employees serving overseas had been operating
with impunity during the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq.'
Although a federal judge recently dismissed the cases of the five
former Blackwater employees charged in the Nisour Square inci-
dent because of the prosecution's misuse of compelled statements,
unresolved questions linger about whether the assertion of crimi-
nal jurisdiction over them was proper in the first place.
* Associate Professor of Law at the University of Idaho College of Law. Thanks to
Matthew Schelstrate, Randy Todd, and Megan Bartley for their assistance in conducting
research and editorial assistance for this Article.
1. See David Johnston &John M. Broder, FBI Says Guards Killed 14 Iraqis Without Cause:
Report on Blackwater, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2007, at Al.
2. See Blackwater Changes Its Name to Xe, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2009, at A10.
3. These individuals were immune to any Iraqi criminal proceeding by virtue of Coa-
lition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order 17 issued on June 27, 2004 by CPA administrator
Paul Bremer, the executive authority in Iraq at the time. See Coalition Provisional Auth.
Order No. 17 (Revised): Status of the Coalition Provisional Authority, MNF-Iraq, Certain
Missions and Personnel in Iraq § 2, 1 3 (June 27, 2004), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49997ada3.html. Order 17 granted "sending na-
tions" exclusive criminal jurisdiction over deployed service members and civilian contractors
serving in Iraq. Id.
4. See Del Quentin Wilber, Charges Dismissed Against Blackwater Guards in Iraqi Deaths,
WASH. POsT,Jan. 1, 2010, at Al.
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This unfortunate chapter in the U.S. occupation of Iraq refo-
cused attention on the 'jurisdictional gap" that has allowed many
civilian employees and contractors of the U.S. government, partic-
ularly American citizens, to escape liability for crimes committed
overseas. This "jurisdictional gap" is a recurring situation where
civilians serving the U.S. government commit crimes outside the
criminal jurisdiction of the United States, but are not subject to
effective criminal accountability by another sovereign.
For more than a century civilian employees and contractors of
the U.S. government working overseas routinely faced criminal
charges before two unique and little-known institutions: U.S. mili-
tary courts-martial and consular courts. However, within a span of
less than ten years in the mid-twentieth century, these two institu-
tions became unavailable as fora for handling overseas criminal
cases-thus creating the jurisdictional gap. The jurisdictional gap
described in this Article began to develop in the late 1950s when a
series of U.S. Supreme Court cases severely restricted the ability of
U.S. military courts-martial to try civilians.5 During the same period
the U.S. consular courts system that had been in existence for
more than a hundred years breathed its last gasp when Congress
repealed the statute authorizing consular courts in 1956.6 Any re-
maining possibility of using military courts-martial as a forum for
holding civilians accountable was firmly interred when the highest
military appellate court declared that civilians could only be sub-
jected to military courts-martial during a time of declared war.'
The loss of these two institutions for handling criminal cases
ended effective criminal accountability for thousands of crimes,
leaving those who committed crimes overseas subject only to the
criminal jurisdiction of host nations that rarely pursued charges
5. Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278, 280 (1960) (holding civilian employees commit-
ting capital offenses not amenable to military jurisdiction); Kinsella v. United States ex rel.
Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 248 (1960) (prohibiting military jurisdiction over civilian depend-
ents in time of peace, regardless of whether the offense was capital or noncapital); Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (holding civilian dependents accompanying the armed forces
overseas in time of peace not triable by court-martial for capital offenses); United States ex
rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 15 (1955) (disapproving the trial by courts-martial of per-
sons not members of the armed forces).
6. See Act of Aug. 1, 1956, ch. 807, 70 Stat. 773 (repealing 22 U.S.C. §§ 141-143
(1952) (granting power to consular courts)).
7. See United States v. Averette, 41 C.M.R. 363, 365 (C.M.A. 1970). In Averette, the
Court of Military Appeals rejected an interpretation of the phrase "time of war" that would
have included times of armed conflict that had not been sanctioned through a formal decla-
ration of war by Congress. Id. The court reasoned that the "most recent guidance in this
area from the Supreme Court" dictated that "a strict and literal construction of the phrase"
should be adopted. Id. The court was inclined to believe that any attempt to expand jurisdic-
tion to the broader spectrum of armed conflict would impermissibly expand the very limited
circumstances under which civilians could be tried by military courts. Id.
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against Americans, especially when the victim of the crime was an-
other American.8 This loss of the capability to maintain criminal
accountability became quite significant as the post-World War II
era was characterized by a dramatic rise in the number of civilians
associated with the U.S. government stationed overseas. By 1999
there were almost 300,000 Department of Defense (DoD) civilian
employees and dependents living abroad.9 At the height of U.S.
involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, at least 197,718 U.S. gov-
ernment contractors, and possibly thousands more, were working
in these countries with nearly 40,000 of this number having Ameri-
can citizenship.10 Thus, we can conservatively estimate that nearly
500,000 civilian employees, dependents, and contractors of the
U.S. government currently enjoy de facto immunity from meaning-
ful criminal accountability as a result of these developments. Of
this number, approximately 340,000 are Americans; the remainder
are third country nationals employed by the U.S. government. As
might be expected, since crimes committed by these personnel oc-
curred overseas with no coverage by American news media, an
"out-of-sight, out-of-mind" attitude seemed to prevail in Congress.
Moreover, the public remained blissfully unaware of the problem
despite the repeated entreaties of the commanders of overseas mil-
itary bases who were primarily responsible for dealing with a
significant amount of crime committed by these relatively large
numbers of civilians.'
After decades of neglecting the jurisdictional gap, Congress fi-
nally acted in 2000 by passing the poorly-named Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA).2 In general, MEJA ex-
tended U.S. criminal jurisdiction for felony-level offenses to DoD
contractors and employees of DoD contractors as well as some
members of the armed forces. Within a few years it became ap-
parent that civilians from many other agencies were also serving
overseas but fell outside the language of the statute. The Act was
8. See Military Extraterritorial junsdiction Act of 1999: Hearing on HR. 3380 Before the Sub-
comm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 8 (2000) [hereinafter
Hearing] (statement of Sen. Steve Chabot, Presiding Chairman, Subcomm. on Crime of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
9. Id.
10. MOSHE SCHWARTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40764, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 5 (2009), available at
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40764.pdf; Robin Acton, War Zone Contracting Termed Huge
"Failure, "PITISBURGH TRIB.-REv., May 4, 2009.
11. Cf 145 CONG. REc. S7925 (daily ed. June 30, 1999) (statement of Sen. Patrick
Leahy).
12. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-523, 114 Stat.
2488 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267 (2006)).
13. See 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (a) (2000).
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amended in 2004 to further expand jurisdiction to include con-
tractors of "any other Federal agency, or any provisional authority,
to the extent such employment relates to supporting the mission of
the Department of Defense overseas."l4
Three years later, the Nisour Square incident occurred and
MEJA, which had been virtually unused since its enactment, was
wielded by federal prosecutors to assert criminal jurisdiction over
the Blackwater guards. This incident, however, quickly revealed the
potential limitations of this relatively new and untested law. Since
all the accused Blackwater guards were under contract with the
Department of State, and not the DoD, the jurisdiction question
became trickier. In order for Blackwater guards to fall under MEJA,
the courts were required to find that their employment "relate [d]
to supporting the mission of the Department of Defense over-
seas."15 Due to questions raised as to whether the guards'
employment related to supporting the mission of the DoD mission
overseas, the possibility that the guards involved in the shooting
may have fallen into the notorious jurisdictional gap prompted
new legislative proposals to further amend MEJA."
The uncertainty surrounding U.S. criminal jurisdiction in these
cases is the latest chapter in a long history of attempts to effectively
and consistently handle crimes committed overseas by U.S. civilians
and others working under the auspices of the U.S. government."
With strong evidence that U.S. reliance on civilian contractors will
continue to grow significantly in the coming years, the problem of
maintaining effective criminal enforcement over civilian employees
and contractors of the U.S. government may be expected to grow
as well.'8
This Article will examine the background to the jurisdictional
gap and analyze historical and contemporary attempts, such as
14. Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub.
L. No. 108-375, § 1088, 118 Stat. 1811, 2066 (2004) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3267(1) (A) (ii) (II) (2006)).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1) (A) (ii) (II).
16. See e.g., MEJA Expansion and Enforcement Act of 2007, H.R. 2740, 110th Cong.
§ 2(a) (2007) (seeking to add contractors of any department or agency of the United States
working in or near an area where U.S. forces are executing a contingency operation to the
list of persons who may be held criminally liable by the United States for certain crimes
outside of U.S. borders).
17. See Heaing, supra note 8.
18. See Acton, supra note 10 ("[R]etired Lt. General William Gus Pagonis, director of
logistics for the Persian Gulf War in 1991, said the military cannot function without third-
party support because private contractors allow troops to focus on the combat mission.
'There have been over a million troops rotated in and out of Iraq and Afghanistan. If not for
third-party contractors, we would have needed 4 million,' Pagonis said. 'I don't know how
we'd do that without the draft.'").
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MEJA and a recent amendment to the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, to expand court-martial jurisdiction over civilians. This
analysis will demonstrate that both MEJA and attempts to subject
civilian contractors overseas to trial by military court-martial are
short-sighted and insufficient solutions in light of the continuing
growth of large numbers of civilians overseas. In light of these defi-
ciencies, this Article will propose that Congress create a system of
overseas Article III courts as a comprehensive and long-term solu-
tion to address the problem of overseas criminal activity by
civilians.
In Part I of this Article, I will examine the background of the
jurisdictional gap and explain its nascence during the 1950s. In
Part II, I will describe Congressional attempts to address the gap
including the Military Extraterriorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 and a
2006 amendment to the UCMJ that ostensibly expanded military
courts-martial jurisdiction over civilians. In Part III, I will explain
why these Congressional remedies have been ineffective and will
not provide a viable long-term solution to the challenges posed by
civilians serving overseas. In Part IV, I will show why use of the mili-
tary justice system to adjudicate criminal charges against civilians is
particularly ill-advised in light of the adverse effects on military
commanders and the military justice system in addition to the ob-
vious constitutional concerns such a regime raises. In Part V, I will
outline a solution to the jurisdictional gap by proposing that
Congress create an Article III court overseas to address these
long-standing concerns. Finally, in Part VI, I will discuss possible
objections to the proposal for overseas courts.
I. BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEMS OF OVERSEAS
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
Traditionally, a nation's criminal jurisdiction usually ended at its
borders,"' and crimes were ordinarily proscribed, tried, and pun-
ished in accordance with the law of the place where they
occurred.20 However, exceptions to this general rule have long
been recognized and incorporated into customary international
19. Brian L. Porto, Annotation, Extrateritorial Criminaljutisdiction of Federal Courts, 1
A.L.R. FED. 2D 415, 415 (2005).
20. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (holding the
near-universal rule that the lawfulness of an act is determined by the law of the country
where the act is done).
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law 2-and sovereign nations have imposed criminal sanctions for
acts committed in a variety of circumstances outside their bor-
ders."
Since its founding, the United States has consistently encoun-
tered situations requiring the extraterritorial application of its
criminal laws. 2 Since there is no constitutional bar, determining
the extent to which laws apply outside the United States is general-
ly a matter of statutory rather than constitutional construction. As
a basic principle of statutory construction, criminal laws are pre-
sumed to have only territorial application unless there is a clear
indication that Congress meant for them to apply extraterritorial-
ly.25 Sometimes the task of determining whether statutes apply
extraterritorially is relatively simple because Congress expressly
states in the statutes themselves that they apply extraterritorially. At
other times the task is more challenging, and a court must struggle
to determine whether Congress may have implied an intent for a
law to apply extraterritorially.26 Over the years Congress has passed
many laws that have been interpreted to have extraterritorial ap-
plication. Although the complete list of crimes runs several pages,
a few examples include:
18 U.S.C. § 81 (arson)
18 U.S.C. § 113 (assault)
21. Customary international law recognizes five bases on which a state may exercise
criminal jurisdiction over a citizen or noncitizen for acts committed outside of the prosecut-
ing state: (1) the "objective territorial principle," which provides for jurisdiction over
conduct committed outside a state's borders that has, or is intended to have, a substantial
effect within its territory; (2) the "nationality principle," which provides for jurisdiction over
extraterritorial acts committed by a state's own citizen; (3) the "protective principle," which
provides forjurisdiction over acts committed outside the state that harm the state's interests;
(4) the "passive personality principle," which provides for jurisdiction over acts that harm a
state's citizens abroad; and (5) the "universality principle," which provides for jurisdiction
over extraterritorial acts by a citizen or noncitizen that are so heinous as to be universally
condemned by all civilized nations. Porto, supra note 19, § 2; see also id. §§ 23-30.
22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402
(1987); cf Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248
(1991); 44B Am.JUR. 2D International Law § 89 (2007).
23. Porto, supra note 19, at 415.
24. Cf Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 173, 188 (1993); Arabian Am.
Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248. These cases cite to the principle found in Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo,
336 U.S. 281, 284-85 (1949), that since Congress may pass laws that apply both inside and
outside the territorial boundaries of the United States, we will normally presume only terri-
torial application unless Congress clearly indicates that it has consciously decided to pass
laws that extend U.S. jurisdiction outside its territorial borders.
25. Haitian Ctrs. Counci4 Inc., 509 U.S. at 173; Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248.
26. See, e.g., United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94,97-98 (1922).
27. These laws generally fall into three main categories: offenses occurring in the spe-
cial maritime and territorial jurisdiction, offenses occurring in the special aircraft
jurisdiction, and those related to treaties with foreign nations. See generally Porto, supra note
19, at 415.
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18 U.S.C. § 114 (maiming)
18 U.S.C. § 117 (domestic assault by an habitual offend-
er)
18 U.S.C. § 546 (smuggling goods into a foreign country
from an American vessel)
18 U.S.C. § 661 (theft)
18 U.S.C. § 662 (receipt of stolen property)
18 U.S.C. § 831 (threats, theft, or unlawful possession of
nuclear material or attempting or conspiring to do
so)
18 U.S.C. § 1025 (false pretenses)
18 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1083 (gambling ships)
18 U.S.C. § 1111 (murder)
18 U.S.C. § 1112 (manslaughter)
18 U.S.C. § 1113 (attempted murder or manslaughter)
18 U.S.C. § 1115 (misconduct or neglect by ship officers)
18 U.S.C. § 1201 (kidnapping)
18 U.S.C. § 1363 (malicious mischief)
18 U.S.C. § 1460 (sale or possession with intent to sell
obscene material)
18 U.S.C. § 1466A (obscene visual representation of sex-
ual abuse of children)
18 U.S.C. § 1587 (captain of a slave vessel with slaves
aboard)
18 U.S.C. § 1591 (sex trafficking of children)
Therefore, there is longstanding and continuing authority for
the imposition of criminal sanctions for activities that occur out-
side U.S. territory.
For more than a century the United States relied on three pri-
mary institutions to impose criminal sanctions for crimes
committed outside U.S. territory: U.S. district courts located inside
the United States, overseas consular courts, and overseas military
courts-martial. Up until the 1950s the responsibility for handling
overseas criminal misconduct fell mainly to consular courts and
military courts-martial, with U.S. district courts inside the U.S. hav-
ing only rare involvement in these types of cases.28
28. For a history of U.S. military courts-martial see WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY
LAW AND PRECEDENTS (2d ed. 1920). Although little is known by the general public about
FALL 2010] 51
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Convened near the situs of alleged offenses and having ready
access to evidence and witnesses, consular courts and military
courts-martial were the default fora for most overseas offenses and
were valued in part because of their ability to deliver justice much
more swiftly and efficiently than federal district courts back in the
United States. However, the virtues of these somewhat peculiar ad
hoc tribunals did not immunize them from long-standing criticism
for imposing serious criminal sanctions on individuals without
providing them with important protections guaranteed by the
Constitution. Despite frequent criticism on these grounds, as well
as charges of corruption in the consular courts, these institutions
tried American citizens overseas up until 1956. It was during that
year that two significant events took place. First, Congress repealed
the statutes authorizing consular courts and closed the last consu-
lar court in Morocco."o Second, the U.S. Supreme Court decided
the landmark case of Reid v. Covert, in which a plurality of the
Court held that the jurisdiction of military courts-martial to try ci-
vilians who are American citizens is extremely limited and reversed
the court-martial convictions of two military spouses for the mur-
ders of their husbands overseas.
A. U.S. Consular Courts
U.S. consular courts were established by Congress under its Arti-
cle I power in the mid-nineteenth century and were authorized to
exercise both criminal and civil jurisdiction.3 ' Expressly permitted
by treaties with foreign nations, these consular tribunals were con-
vened by embassy staff overseas and typically resolved cases
involving U.S. citizens.3 However, the most famous case construing
consular courts and military courts-martial, these two esoteric non-Article III institutions
have fascinating histories and lineages going back several centuries.
29. CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & VIKRAM DAVID
AMAR, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4107, at 20 (3d ed. 2007).
30. On August 1, 1956, Congress repealed the laws that gave consular courts their
power. Pub. L. 84-857, 70 Stat. 774 (repealing 22 U.S.C. §§ 141-143 (1954)). Section 141
related to the judicial authority generally of ministers and consuls of the United States in
China, Siam, Turkey, Morocco, Muscat, Abyssinia, Persia, and the territories formerly a part
of the Ottoman Empire including Egypt. Section 142 related to the general criminal juris-
diction of ministers and consuls of the United States. Section 143 related to the general
jurisdiction of ministers and consuls of the United States and venue in civil cases. The power
of courts-martial over civilians was greatly restricted in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), and
United States v. Averette, 41 C.M.R. 363 (C.M.A. 1970).
31. 354 U.S. at 5.
32. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining "consular courts").
33. See In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 461-62 (1891); see also 22 U.S.C. § 142 (criminal mat-
ters); 22 U.S.C. § 143 (civil matters).
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the power of consular courts involved the exercise of criminal ju-
risdiction over a foreign national. In the case of Ross v. McIntyre,
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1891, the power of consular
courts to impose criminal sanctions without the protections of the
Constitution was challenged by a seaman who was convicted of
murder by a U.S. consular court sitting in Japan." Ross, the de-
fendant, was a British citizen accused of murdering an American
merchant seaman aboard a U.S. merchant vessel in the port of
Yokohama, Japan. As the right to a jury did not attach under the
rules for consular courts, Ross was convicted and sentenced to
death by a court composed of the Consul General and four associ-
ate consuls.
Although the death sentence was eventually commuted to life
imprisonment by President Rutherford B. Hayes, 6 Ross pursued an
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court and argued that his trial by con-
sular court was invalid since he had been deprived of the Fifth
Amendment right to indictment by grand jury and the Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury. The Court rejected Ross's ar-
guments and affirmed the criminal jurisdiction of consular courts,
finding that the practice of subjecting persons serving on mer-
chant vessels outside the territory of the United States to trial by
consular officials was a well-established practice of "Christian" na-
tions and that the constitutional protections provided by the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments did not extend beyond the territory of the
United States. In ratifying the criminal jurisdiction exercised by
consular courts, the Court made clear that the jurisdiction of these
consular courts extended even to citizens of other countries so
long as treaties with host nations allowed the exercise of such ju-
risdiction."
Notwithstanding the decision in Ross, consular courts continued
to be the targets of constant criticism for their corruption and
34. 140 U.S. 453, 454 (1891).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 454-55.
37. Id. at 463-64. Ross also argued that he was a British citizen and the consular courts
had no power to try a foreigner for criminal offenses. The Supreme Court rejected this con-
tention as well, finding that when he agreed to serve on an American merchant vessel he
consented to the jurisdiction of the United States. Id. at 472-73.
38. This view was later repudiated in Reid. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1957). The
Court in that case stated that "[i] nsofar as [Ross v. McIntyre] expressed a view that the Consti-
tution is not operative outside the United States ... it expressed a notion that has long since
evaporated. Governmental action abroad is performed under both the authority and the
restrictions of the Constitution . . . ." Id. at 56.
39. Ross, 140 U.S. at 474-75.
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failure to provide constitutional protections." This criticism even-
tually became strident enough to lead Congress into another little-
known experiment, the creation of the U.S. Court for China in
1906. Composed of a U.S. District Court judge sitting in mainland
China, the U.S. Court for China heard civil and criminal cases for
almost forty years until it was abolished by Congress in 1943.41
While this Article will not dwell on the colorful history of this
court, it is important to recognize that the prior existence of the
consular courts and the U.S. Court for China serves as precedent
for the establishment of non-military criminal courts outside U.S.
territory, a principle for which this Article will later advocate.
B. Military Courts-Martial
During the same period, the other primary method of holding
civilians criminally accountable overseas was by subjecting them to
trial by military courts-martial. Trial of civilians by military courts,
although never commonplace, was a well-established practice
adopted from the British Articles of War by the Continental Con-
gress during the American Revolution.4 3 The first American
Articles of War contained the following provision: "All Suttlers and
Retainers to a Camp, and all persons whatsoever serving with our
Armies in the Field, though no [sic] inlisted Soldiers, are to be sub-
ject to orders, according to the Rules and Discipline of War."4 4
Although the term suttler has fallen from regular usage, during
this time period the word referred to civilians who provided sol-
diers with food and provisions. Suttlers normally set up shop near
40. See Herbert H.D. Pierce, Report on Inspection of the United States Consulates in
the Orient, H.R. Doc. No. 59-665, at 322-444 (1906).
41. An Act Creating a United States Court for China and Prescribing the Jurisdiction
Thereof, Pub. L. No. 59-403, 34 Stat. 814 (1906), repealed by Treaty for the Relinquishment of
Extraterritorial Rights in China and the Regulation of Related Matters, U.S.-ChinaJan. 11,
1943, 57 Stat. 767.
42. The judges for the U.S. Court for China handed down decisions in both criminal
and civil cases. Among the greatest challenges faced by the judges on this court was what law
to apply. The court enjoyed significant discretion in choosing which law to apply and this
aspect alone is an interesting historical curiosity in the annals of American law. See Teemu
Ruskola, Colonialism Without Colonies: On the Extraterritorial Jurisprudence of the U.S. Court for
China (Emory Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No.
09-67, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1485687.
43. See WINTHROP, supra note 28, at 98.
44. British Articles of War of 1765, art. XXIII, reprinted in WINTHROP, supra note 28, at
921, 941. The Article first appeared in 1747. FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER, CIVILIANS UNDER
MILITARYJUSTICE 21-22 (1967).
45. See, e.g., 2 JOHN BOUVIER, A LAw DICTIONARY: ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION
AND LAwS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND OF THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE AMERI-
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military encampments or accompanied forces in the field when
they were deployed. The term "retainer" referred mainly to wives
or significant others who resided in the vicinity of military en-
campments.4 Thus, the Articles of War explicitly authorized the
exercise ofjurisdiction over civilians who remained in close contact
with military forces through either business or personal relation-
ships.
George Washington made significant use of civilian contractors
to support his forces in the field, mainly in providing supply and
logistical services to the Continental Army. In accordance with the
American Articles of War, largely adopted verbatim from the Brit-
ish Articles of War, civilians have been subject to military criminal
jurisdiction from the days of the founding of the Republic.4 s The
practice continued up through the American Civil War when mili-
tary operations of unprecedented scale in America caused great
numbers of civilians to come into contact with the armies of both
sides.4 9 The U.S. Civil War was characterized by a vast expansion in
the exercise of military jurisdiction over civilians, both those sup-
porting the armed forces and those who happened to be living or
working within a particular army's area of operations. Military ju-
risdiction over unaffiliated civilians was mainly asserted in areas
where civil order had broken down, but sometimes it was asserted
in areas where this was not the case.
The U.S. Supreme Court decided a case shortly after the end of
the war that dramatically narrowed the situations when civilians
could be tried by military courts on U.S. territory. In Ex Parte Milli-
gan, the Court curtailed the power of military commanders to hold
and try civilians before military tribunals.5 o The case arose in 1864
during the final months of the Civil War when a civilian named
CAN UNION 546 (2d ed. 1843) (defining "sutler" as "[a] man whose employment is to sell
provisions and liquor to a camp").
46. See David L. Snyder, Civilian Military Contractors on Trial. The Case for Upholding the
Amended Exceptional Jurisdiction Clause of the Uniform Code of Military justice, 44 TEX. INT'L L.J.
1, 73 (2008).
47. See PETER W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILI-
TARY INDUSTRY 19-40 (2003).
48. For a concise summary of the origins of military jurisdiction over civilians, see
Geoffrey S. Corn, Bringing Discipline to the Civilianization of the Battlefield: A Proposal for
a More Legitimate Approach to Resurrecting Military-Criminal Jurisdiction over Civilian
Augmentees, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 491, 501 (2008).
49. See WINTHROP, supra note 28, at 97-101; see also The Civil War, PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/civilwar/war/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2010) ("More than 3 million Ameri-
cans fought in it, and over 600,000 men, 2 percent of the population, died in it.... In two
days at Shiloh, on the banks of the Tennessee River, more American men fell than in all the
previous American wars combined. At Cold Harbor, some 7,000 Americans fell in twenty
minutes.").
50. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 3 (1866).
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Milligan was arrested by federal military authorities and charged
with conspiracy to overthrow the United States." Milligan was con-
victed by a military tribunal convened by a federal army
commander and sentenced to death . However, Milligan's execu-
tion was delayed until the end of the war, and in the meantime his
case made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court on appeal." In ruling
that military tribunals may not try civilians in areas where civil
courts are still open, the Court drew heavily upon the Founding
Fathers' negative experiences with British military law in the peri-
od leading up to the Revolution.54
Even though Ex Parte Milligan effectively ended the use of mili-
tary courts to try civilians inside the United States, due to the
absence of any U.S. or state court system overseas, the practice of
allowing trial of civilians connected with the military by military
courts-martial outside the territory of the United States continued
for almost a century after Milligan was decided. A new round of
Articles of War reaffirmed the practice of subjecting civilians to
trial by courts-martial overseas in 1916." Article 2(d) of the Articles
of War was revised to extend courts-martial jurisdiction to "[a] 11
retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving
with the armies of the United States without the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the United States." 56 During World War II the practice was
never seriously questioned even though hundreds of civilians were
tried and punished by courts-martial."7 However, there was bitter
criticism from former service members who had faced the harsh
military justice system during the course of the war. Their anger at
the unfairness of the system led to a very strong movement to re-
form military justice.
In response to this movement, Congress enacted the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) in 1950 to modernize and stand-
58
ardize military criminal law and procedure across the services.
Created with the input of criminal law scholars and military justice
experts, the new code reaffirmed the principle that civilians could
be subject to trial by courts-martial in certain situations. Those sit-
uations were set forth in 10 U.S.C. § 802(a) (10)-(12) as follows:
51. Id. at 6.
52. Id. at 7.
53. See id. at 8.
54. Id. at 37-38.
55. See Law of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418, § 3, 39 Stat. 619, 650-70 ("The articles included
in this section shall be known as the Articles of War. . .
56. Id. at 651 (article 2(d) of the Articles of War).
57. Lisa Turner, The Articles of War and the UCMJ, AEROSPACE POWERJ., Fall 2006, at 99.
58. See Act of May 5, 1950, Pub. L. 81-506, 64 Stat. 107 (codified as amended at 10
U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2006)).
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(a) The following persons are subject to this chapter:
(10) In time of war ... , persons serving with or accompany-
ing an armed force in the field.
(11) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United
States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of interna-
tional law, persons serving with, employed by, or
accompanying the armed forces outside the United States and
outside the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the
Virgin Islands.
(12) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United
States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of interna-
tional law, persons within an area leased by or otherwise
reserved or acquired for the use of the United States which is
under the control of the Secretary concerned and which is
outside the United States and outside the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands.
Within a decade of the code's promulgation the Supreme Court
was called upon to decide whether the prosecution of civilians in a
court-martial based on jurisdiction under 10 U.S.C. § 802(a) (11)
was constitutional. In the landmark case of Reid v. Covert," the
Court reviewed for a second time the cases of two civilian wives of
service members stationed overseas who had been convicted of
murder by military courts-martial. During the previous term, a ma-
jority of the Court had held that the provisions of Article III and
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments-which require that crimes be
tried by a jury after indictment by a grand jury-did not protect a
U.S. citizen when tried by the U.S. government in foreign lands for
offenses committed there, and that Congress could provide for the
trial of such offenses in any manner it saw fit so long as the
procedures established were reasonable and consonant with due
60process.
In Reid the Court reversed this decision and held that the rights
guaranteed by Article III, Section 2; the Fifth Amendment; and
Sixth Amendment continued to protect U.S. citizens in criminal
61
proceedings brought by the United States against them overseas.
59. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
60. United States ex reL Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 (1955).
61. Reid, 354 U.S. at 5 (plurality opinion).
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One key question turned upon the interpretation of some particu-
lar language of the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment
provides that "[n] o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on presentment or indictment of
a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger.""
The Court discussed the language of the Fifth Amendment
which requires grand jury indictment "except in cases arising in
the land and naval forces" and determined that the cases against
the civilian dependents of military officers do not "aris [e] in the
land or naval forces."6 The Court also discussed the constitutional
and historical reasons why military courts-martial jurisdiction arises
only against those who are part of the armed forces. Contrary to
the holding in Ross, the Court stated unequivocally that when the
United States acts against its citizens abroad, it can do so only in
accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution,
including Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Howev-
er, with respect to the possibility of trying civilians before
courts-martial, one passage in Reid left open a small crack that was
to be used to justify the prosecution of civilian contractors by
courts-martial during the Vietnam War:
Even if it were possible, we need not attempt here to precisely
define the boundary between "civilians" and members of the
"land and naval Forces." We recognize that there might be
circumstances where a person could be "in" the armed ser-
vices for purposes of Clause 14 even though he had not
formally been inducted into the military or did not wear a
uniform.6
Because the cases before the Court in Reid involved civilian de-
pendents with little other connection to the military, the military
continued to use courts-martial to hold contractors and other civil-
ians who were assisting the armed forces in the field criminally
accountable under 10 U.S.C. § 802(10). In 1967, the U.S. Court of
Military Appeals held that Reid precluded the court-martial of a
civilian contactor in Vietnam since he was not part of the armed
forces and since the events giving rise to charges took place during
the absence of a declared war.'
62. U.S. CONsT. amend. V (emphasis added).
63. Reid, 354 U.S. at 19 n.38.
64. See id. at 19-21.
65. Id. at 22-23.
66. United States v. Averette, 41 C.M.R. 363, 364 (C.M.A. 1970).
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These cases led to the creation of the 'jurisdictional gap." As
noted, supra, this 'jurisdictional gap" is a recurring situation where
civilians serving the U.S. government commit crimes outside the
criminal jurisdiction of the United States, but are not subject to
effective criminal accountability by another sovereign."' Because of
the limited public visibility of cases arising overseas, the jurisdic-
tional gap received little attention despite the insistent calls of
military commanders for Congress to take action. However, begin-
ning in the early 1970s the DoD began privatization, a cost-saving
initiative to "outsource" many jobs that had previously been per-
formed by military members to civilian firms.6 s This movement was
greatly accelerated through the Reagan, Clinton, and both Bush
administrations. Jobs subject to privatization mainly included tasks
like supply, logistics, and food services.69 The theory behind privati-
zation was that competition for contracts among civilian providers
would reduce costs and increase quality in ways that could not be
accomplished by leaving these jobs in the hands of military mem-
bers. One consequence of the privatization program was to
substantially increase the number of civilians serving with the mili-
tary both at home and abroad. Once the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan began, this effect was even more dramatic as more
than 200,000 civilians-up to 40,000 of them Americans-served
overseas under lucrative contracts with the U.S. government to
provide a multitude of different services.o
While the number of U.S. citizens serving overseas has risen over
the past fifty years-gradually at first, then dramatically with privat-
ization-the abandonment of consular courts and the loss of
military courts-martial jurisdiction were the most significant factors
67. See supra text following note 4.
68. See Ann R. Markusen, The Case Against Privatizing National Security, 16 GOVERNANCE
471, 474 (2003).
69. The jobs performed by contractors include
guarding officials, military installations, and supply convoys; training local troops and
police forces; providing interrogators, translators, and transcribers; maintaining and
repairing vehicles and aircraft, including the guidance and surveillance systems on
tanks and helicopters; running logistics operations and supervising supply lines; driv-
ing supply trucks that carry fuel and food; providing warehousing and storage
facilities; setting up Internet access and maintaining computer systems; preparing
meals for ... soldiers; cleaning military facilities, including Army bases and offices;
washing clothes; and building housing.
Esther Pan, Iraq: Military Outsourcing, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (May 20, 2004),
http://www.cfr.org/publication/7667/iraq.html#p5.
70. See MOSHE SCHWARTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CON-
TRACTORS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 5 (2009).
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in creating the jurisdictional gap. We now turn to examine several
attempts that have been made to remedy the jurisdictional gap.
II. CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS TO Fix THE
JURISDICTIONAL GAP
A. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act
After decades of concern about this jurisdictional gap, Congress
attempted to remedy the problem by passing the Military Extrater-
ritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) in 2000." The debate and passage
of MEJA was hastened by the decision of the Second Circuit in
United States v. Gatlin, which overturned the guilty plea of an Amer-
ican accused of the sexual abuse of his step-daughter while living in
Germany. Relying on the pre-MEJA decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court, the Second Circuit held that the accused fell outside the
criminal jurisdiction of the United States since he was living in
Germany at the time of the alleged offenses. Because the accused
fell into the gap, the Second Circuit's decision reversed his convic-
tion despite his sentence to fifteen years in prison by the federal
district court." The German government chose not to exercise ju-
risdiction, so when Gatlin went scot-free the outrage generated by
this result created the momentum sufficient to spur Congress to
finally act. 5
On November 22, 2000, President Bill Clinton signed MEJA into
law, extending federal criminal jurisdiction to members of the
armed forces and those civilians employed by or accompanying the
armed forces outside the United States. MEJA's grant of jurisdic-
tion extended only to those crimes which would be considered
71. Pub. L. No. 106-523, 114 Stat. 2488 (2000) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267
(2006)).
72. United States v. Gatlin, 216 F.3d 207, 216 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that it was clear
from the legislative history that Congress intended 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) to apply exclusively to
the territorial United States, and therefore the overseas military housing area was not within
the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction).
73. See id. at 220.
74. See id. at 223.
75. The Act extended the criminal jurisdiction of the United States to conduct com-
mitted outside the United States that would constitute a felony under federal law if engaged
in within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. The new
criminal provision applied only to two groups of people: persons employed by or accompa-
nying the armed forces outside of the United States and persons who are members of the
armed forces. The punishment for committing a qualifying crime under the statute is that
which would have been imposed under federal law had the crime been committed in the
United States. See 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (a).
76. See id.
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felony offenses if committed within the special maritime and terri-
torial jurisdiction of the United States. Although members of the
armed forces were already subject to federal law under the UCMJ,
MEJA also made them ostensibly subject to prosecution for viola-
tions of the federal criminal code while serving overseas as well.
However, by its own terms MEJA severely limited jurisdiction over
service members to instances when they were no longer subject to
the UCMJ or when they were charged with committing an offense
with one or more other defendants, at least one of whom was not
subject to the UCMJ.n7 Therefore, the title of MEJA is misleading in
its suggestion that the act is aimed at military members. The actual
extension of jurisdiction to military members is extremely limited
under MEJA.
The real focus of MEJA was on making DoD civilians and con-
tractors living and working overseas amenable to criminal
prosecution. However, the language of MEJA left significant un
certainty as to which persons would be considered "employed by or
accompanying the armed forces outside the United States." This
proved problematic when the Abu Ghraib prison scandal broke in
April 2004. While U.S. military members were prosecuted under
the UCMJ for abusing detainees, their civilian counterparts who
were equally culpable escaped criminal liability." Although there
was a great deal of talk by members of the Bush Administration
about prosecuting them under MEJA, they soon realized that the
language of MEJA did not cover them because they were under
contract with the CIA and Department of Interior.o
Once again reacting to another crisis, Congress amended MEJA
in 2004, explicitly extending jurisdiction to civilian members of
agencies and contractors of those agencies "to the extent [their]
employment relates to supporting the mission of the Department of De-
fense overseas."8' However, this ambiguous amendment left a
substantial number of unresolved questions as to whether certain
groups who work closely with the armed forces have employment
that "relates to supporting the mission of the Department of De-
fense overseas." Even more troubling in some ways is that MEJA left
a broad group of persons who arguably should have been within
the statute's reach clearly outside its ambit. Those persons includ-
ed contractors like the Blackwater employees involved in the
77. See id. § 3261 (d).
78. See H.R. REP. No. 106-778, at 4-5 (2000).
79. See Tara McKelvey, The Unaccountables, AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 2006, at 44, 47.
80. See id.
81. 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1)(A) (i) (II) (emphasis added).
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Nisour Square incident working for other governmental agencies
like the Department of State.
Although this problem had long been recognized and lamented
in many scholarly publications, it did not receive much public at-
tention until the high-profile shooting incident involving
Blackwater contractors on September 16, 2007 finally brought
widespread public awareness to this jurisdictional issue. Because
these Blackwater employees were not under DoD contract and
were providing security to diplomatic and political personnel un-
der a contract with the State Department, they arguably fell outside
the definition of persons "supporting the mission of Department of
Defense overseas." Although this issue was never resolved because
the cases arising from the Nisour Square incident were dismissed
in late December 2009, this was the argument that attorneys for
the accused Blackwater contractors had made prior to the case's
dismissal."'
Although MEJA has been in place since 2000, it has proven to be
largely toothless; between 2000 and 2008 only twelve cases were
brought by the Department of Justice under MEJA.84 The ineffec-
tiveness of MEJA was raised not only with respect to the Abu
Ghraib scandal, but also with respect to a pattern of alleged sexual
assaults by contractors overseas. The U.S. Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations held hearings on this issue in April 2008 only to
be informed that no prosecutions had been brought for sexual as-
saults on employees of government contractors like Kellogg,
Brown, and Root despite dozens of complaints being filed.
B. Amendment to the UCMJ
Simmering in the background was another approach that would
require amendment of Article (2) (10) of the UCMJ to allow mili-
tary commanders to assert courts-martial jurisdiction over civilians
accompanying the armed forces during contingency operations-
82. See Timothy Williams, Iraqis Angered at Dropping of Blackwater Charges, N.Y. TimEs,
Jan. 1, 2010, at Al.
83. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction at 2, United States v.
Slough, 679 F. Supp. 2d (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 1:08-CR-360-RMU).
84. Closing Legal Loopholes: Prosecuting Sexual Assaults and Other Violent Crimes Committed
Overseas by American Civilians in a Combat Environment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l
Operations & Orgs., Democracy & Human Rights of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 110th
Cong. 42 (2008) (statement of Sigal P. Mandelker, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal
Division, Department ofJustice).
85. Id. at 1-3 (statement of Sen. Bill Nelson, Chairman, Subcomm. on Int'l Operations
& Orgs., Democracy & Human Rights).
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the idea being to close at least part of the gap created by Reid and
Averrett. An Overseas Jurisdiction Advisory Committee created at
Congressional direction and composed of attorneys for the military
departments, the Departments of Defense, Justice, and State had
studied the problem and recommended amending the UCMJ so
that civilians would fall under court-martial jurisdiction when sup-
porting contingency operations. However, the DoD rejected this
recommendation because it presented "unique constitutional
questions" and would give rise to "several significant anomalies in
the existing structure governing civilian disciplinary matters."8 7 Be-
cause the DoD did not support the recommendation, it did not
make it into the final version of MEJA that was passed by Congress.
However, supporters of this approach finally had their way when
a five-word amendment inserted into the FY2007 Defense Appro-
priation Act passed without debate or careful consideration by
Congress. The original language of the provision stated that the
UMCJ applied to the following category of persons:
(10) In time of war, persons serving with or accompanying an
88
armed force in the field.
The amendment to the UCMJ passed in the appropriation bill
struck the word "war" following "In time of" and inserted "declared
war or a contingency operation."8" Thus, the new provision applied
the UCMJ to the following category of persons:
(10) In time of declared war or contingency operation, per-
sons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the
field.90
The term "contingency operation," defined by reference to an-
other provision of the U.S. Code, means a military operation that
"is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which
86. Id.
87. Military Extraternitorial jurisdiction Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 3380 Before the Sub-
comm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 8 (2000) (statement of Robert E.
Reed, Associate Deputy General Counsel, Department of Defense). There was discussion in
the MEJA committee hearings about this approach. Id. An overseas jurisdiction advisory
committee-comprised of attorneys for the military department, the Departments of De-
fense andJustice, and an attorney from the State Department-made recommendations. Id.
88. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (2000).
89. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No.
109-364, § 552, 120 Stat. 2083, 2217 ("Paragraph (10) of section 801(a) of title 10, United
States Code . .. , is amended by striking 'war' and inserting 'declared war or a contingency
operation.'").
90. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a) (10) (2006).
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members of the armed forces are or may become involved in mili-
tary actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the
United States or against an opposing military force."01
Although this was a potentially significant change to the crimi-
nal jurisdiction contractors faced, the amendment was inserted
into the FY2007 Defense Appropriation Act without discussion and
completely bereft of legislative history to assist in its interpretation.
Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, who is generally cred-
ited for insertion of the provision, declared with satisfaction,
"' [t] his will bring uniformity to the commander's ability to control
the behavior of people representing our country.' 9 2 However, de-
spite Senator Graham's optimistic forecast, to date the new
amendment has been utilized only once-against a non-US citizen
who was serving as a contractor.9 3 On June 22, 2008, Alaa Moham-
mad Ali, an Iraqi with dual Canadian citizenship serving as an
interpreter for U.S. forces in Iraq, pleaded guilty to the wrongful
appropriation of a knife, obstruction ofjustice, and making a false
statement.9 4 Ali was tried and sentenced by a general court-martial
and was awarded five months confinement by the presiding mili-
tary judge.9 His appeals to the military appellate court system have
been summarily denied.
III. WHY THE MEJA SOLUTION ALONE IS INSUFFICIENT
To ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS
The small number of cases that have been prosecuted under
MEJA is evidence of its minimal effectiveness. As stated above, be-
tween 2000 and 2008, only a total of twelve cases were brought by
the Department of Justice under MEJA.9 This fact allows us to
draw some interesting inferences concerning the relative effective-
ness of MEJA in addressing serious crime. According to the FBI,
the average violent crime rate between 2001 and 2008 was 475 per
91. Id.§101(a)(13)(A).
92. Griff Witte, New Law Could Subject Civilians to Military Trial: Provision Aimed at Con-
tractors, but Some Fear It Will Sweep Up Other Workers, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2007, at Al, All
(quoting Sen. Lindsey Graham).
93. See Press Release, Multi-National Corps, Public Affairs Office, Camp Victory, Civil-
ian Contractor Convicted at a Court-Martial (June 22, 2008).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Ali v. Austin, 67 MJ. 186 (CA.A.F. 2008); Ali v. Austin, 67 M.J. 168 (C.AAF.
2008).
97. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 44:1
The Case for Overseas Article III Courts
98
100,000 persons. The FBI considers only four types of offenses as
falling within its definition of violent crime: murder and non-
negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated as-
sault." Although these are all considered felony-level offenses, they
comprise only a portion of total felonies: those that are considered
particularly dangerous ones.
Assuming conservatively that there were 300,000 civilian em-
ployees and contractors of the U.S. government overseas and that
they committed violent felony crimes at the same rate as the gen-
eral U.S. population, there would have been approximately 11,404
violent crimes committed between the beginning of 2001 and the
end of 2008. However, comparing the particular civilian employ-
ees, dependents, and contractors of the U.S. government to the
general population might be unfair as there is a certain amount of
screening that applies to these individuals. Even if we cut this fig-
ure by seventy-five percent for the sake of argument, there would
have been approximately 3000 violent felonies committed. Thus,
the choice to prosecute only twelve cases of a likely 3000 gives us a
prosecution rate of approximately four-tenths of a percent. This
rate seems unreasonably small, and unless the civilian population
serving in Iraq and other overseas locations are substantially more
law-abiding than members of the population, MEJA has been a
failure.
If we look at current procedures for initiating prosecutions un-
der MEJA perhaps we can understand how the difficulties
associated with the logistics of prosecutions may help to account
for the low number of prosecutions. Currently, defendants prose-
cuted under MEJA are brought to trial in accordance with 18
U.S.C. § 3238, which provides that the accused shall be tried in the
U.S. federal district in which "the offender . . . is arrested or is first
brought."'00 Department of Justice policy currently requires the
case to be initially referred to the DOJ Criminal Division's Human
98. See Crime in the United States 2008: Table 1-By Volume and Rate Per 100,000 Inhabit-
ants, 1989-2008, FBI.Gov, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2008
(follow "Violent Crime" hyperlink; then follow "Table 1" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 29,
2010).
99. See Crime in the United States 2008: Violent Cime, FBI.Gov http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2008 (follow "Violent Crime" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 29,
2010).
100. 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (2006) ("The trial of all offenses begun or committed upon the
high seas, or elsewhere out of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district, shall be in
the district in which the offender, or any one of two or more joint offenders, is arrested or is
first brought; but if such offender or offenders are not so arrested or brought into any dis-
trict, an indictment or information may be filed in the district of the last known residence of
the offender or of any one of two or more joint offenders, or if no such residence is known
the indictment or information may be filed in the District of Columbia.").
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Rights and Special Prosecutions Section (HRSP). o HRSP reviews
the case for applicability of MEJA and then refers it to what it con-
siders the most appropriate U.S. Attorney's Office (USAO). The
USAO then reviews the case and informs HRSP as to whether it
intends to proceed with the prosecution."o2 Since MEJA does not
clearly delineate the federal district within which prosecutions may
be initiated, the current procedure gives a great deal of discretion
to the DOJ as to which USAO will prosecute the case. This flexibil-
ity is valuable to the DOJ as it potentially allows HRSP to select a
USAO that is best-suited to handle the case, taking into considera-
tion such factors as workloads and experience levels of the various
USAOs throughout the country. However, since all the cases occur
outside the physical boundaries of the federal district, there is little
incentive or political pressure for federal prosecutors to want to
take up a particular case.
Once the case is assigned to a particular USAO, the Assistant
U.S. Attorney (AUSA) charged with prosecuting the case faces sig-
nificant challenges. Many of the challenges are practical in nature
and relate to the difficulty of trying a case in a U.S. federal district
court on U.S. soil when all the events that form the basis for the
charge occurred in a foreign country. These challenges include
procuring witnesses and evidence from an overseas location and
potentially bringing them to the United States for trial. Without
compulsory process and the ability to control the handling of key
evidence, the AUSA handling the case will likely be confronted by
a seemingly endless series of obstacles. In sum, these cases have big
drawbacks in terms of time investment and difficulties in securing
and producing evidence in court. These drawbacks, which likely
account for the dearth of cases prosecuted under MEJA, will be
ameliorated by establishing overseas courts. By having court pro-
ceedings near the situs of criminal offenses, witnesses may be
brought to court much more easily since there will be no require-
ment for them to travel to the United States to testify.
Furthermore, prosecutors will likely be able to work very closely
with local authorities for the handling and processing of other
types of evidence.
It is important to note that I do not advocate the repeal of
MEJA, but I submit that it provides only part of the solution. The
part that it provides-extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction-is criti-
cal to the success of overseas courts. Although MEJA's jurisdictional
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grant needs to be broadened to explicitly cover contractors that
are not supporting the mission of the DoD, recent proposals to fur-
ther amend MEJA to cover other categories of persons are certainly
steps in the right direction.
IV. WHY USE OF THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM TO ADJUDICATE
CRIMINAL CASES IS ILL-ADVISED
Many academic commentators have advocated subjecting civil-
ians, particularly contractors, to discipline under the military
justice system.'03 Scholars such as Geoffrey S. Corn, William C. Pe-
ters, and Lawrence J. Schwarz have argued in various ways that this
is the most feasible and just solution to what is likely to be a long-
term problem. However, these commentators not only give very
little weight to the reasoning in Reid, but also fail to consider the
cost to military commanders on the ground of executing this addi-
tional responsibility. For example, Corn acknowledges the many
difficulties associated with applying the full corpus of the UCMJ,
but advocates subjecting civilians to summary courts-martial, a wa-
tered-down form of court-martial with limited due process and
extremely light punishment that is capped at no more than 30-days
imprisonment.'0 4 While sensible in some ways, proposals like this
are akin to trying to treat a sucking chest wound with a band-aid.
They do little to address the major concerns here-effectively deal-
ing with serious criminal misconduct that is going virtually
unpunished under the current MEJA regime. William C. Peters, on
the other hand, barely acknowledges the serious constitutional is-
sues, while urging application of the UCMJ to civilians in sweeping
terms: "Soldiers and civilians accused of like misconduct in a like
wartime setting should not answer to different courts, different
procedures, and different law.,,o5 Such an approach fails to appre-
ciate the fundamental differences between military service
members and civilians in a civilized society. Just because applying
the UCMJ to civilians in certain situations would be expedient does
not provide moral justification for such application of military
103. See Geoffrey S. Corn, supra note 48; William C. Peters, On Law, Wars, and Mercenar-
ies: The Case for Courts-Martial Jurisdiction over Civilian Contractor Misconduct in Iraq, 2006 BYU
L. REv. 367; Lawrence J. Schwarz, The Case for Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Civilians Under
Article 2(a)(10) of the Uniform Code of Military justice, ARMy LAW., Oct./Nov. 2002, at 31; David
L. Snyder, Civilian Military Contractors on Trial The Case for Upholding the Amended Exceptional
Jurisdiction Clause of the Uniform Code of Military justice, 44 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1 (2008).
104. Corn, supra note 48, at 522-37.
105. Peters, supra note 103, at 412.
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criminal law, a body of law which is fundamentally different in its
philosophical underpinnings than ordinary civilian criminal law.
Other commentators, like Katherine Jackson, have articulated
the significant shortcomings of attempting to extend military
court-martial jurisdiction to civilian contractors."' She points out
the difference in ways civilians support the armed forces and how
the specific type of job that civilians perform would logically have
some bearing on whether the assertion of military courts-martial
jurisdiction would be justified."o
A. The Unique Needs of the Military
The military justice system is a specialized criminal justice system
designed specifically to address the unique needs of the military.
Driven mainly by the UCMJ and featuring significant advances over
the previous Articles of War, the military justice system has evolved
for the specific purpose of maintaining good order and discipline
for our national armed forces.0 " Although the UCMJ provides a
fair and efficient way of handling the military's unique needs, there
are features of the military justice system that are simply incompat-
ible with its use in trying those not in military service. For example,
although the UCMJ contains many crimes that also appear in the
civilian criminal codes throughout all jurisdictions like larceny,
rape, robbery, arson, and murder, the UCMJ also criminalizes
many unique military offenses that have no analogue in civilian
criminal codes. Examples of these uniquely-military crimes include
disrespect toward a superior commissioned officer,'09 assault or will-
ful disobedience of an order,"0 absence without leave,"' and
misbehavior of a sentinel.'12 Advocates of applying the UCMJ to
civilians have yet to articulate limits on the extent to which military
commanders may hold civilians criminally liable. The text of the
UCMJ offers no guidance, but it seems unreasonable to argue that
the full corpus of the UCMJ applies to all "persons serving with, or
accompanying the armed forces" in the field during a contingency
operation. Without some principled delineation of crimes that are
106. Katherine Jackson, Not Quite a Civilian, Not Quite a Soldier: How Five Words Could Sub-
ject Civilian Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan to Military Jurisdiction, 27J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN.
L.JUDICIARY 255 (2007).
107. Id. at 283-85.
108. For a history of the UCMJ, see 95 CONG. REc. 5,718 (1949).
109. 10 U.S.C. § 889 (2006).
110. Id. § 890.
111. Id. § 886.
112. Id. § 913.
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applicable only to civilians, a significant possibility exists for mili-
tary officials to prosecute civilians for a whole set of offenses
designed to ensure good order and discipline within the military,
but having little applicability to civilians. Although not addressed
in detail by the recent blue ribbon commission on military justice,
concerns over this issue were highlighted for careful considera-
tion."3
B. Constitutional Concerns
There are also several significant constitutional concerns with
having civilians held for trial by courts-martial under the UCMJ.
First, under the UCMJ, there is no right to trial by jury for an ac-
cused in a military court-martial as is required for civilians under
the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The accused in a
military court-martial is tried by a panel of military personnel cho-
sen by a senior officer in charge of a major military unit, usually at
least a battalion for ground forces and any number of different
types of vessels for naval forces.H4 This senior officer is designated
as the court-martial convening authority (CA) and must select the
panel of officers that is convened for the court-martial in each in-
dividual case. Unlike selection of the jury pool in a civilian case,
the convening authority is required to choose the best qualified
members of his command to sit on the court-martial based on
"age, education, training, experience, length of service and judicial
temperament.""' In this system the convening authority hand-picks
the officers who comprise the court-martial. Although this flaw is
ameliorated greatly by the opportunity for an accused to voir dire
the members and challenge them both peremptorily and for cause,
the commander still retains tremendous power by being able to
constitute the initial pool in a way that she sees fit. Inherent in this
system is the danger of "jury stacking," which is a danger within the
military justice system that has long been recognized and repeated-
ly criticized by commentators.' Many military justice experts have
113. NAT'L INST. MILITARY JUSTICE & Am. BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
MILITARYJUSTICE 4 (2009).
114. A battalion is a middle echelon unit in the Army and Marine Corps. Typically it is
composed of approximately 600 soldiers or Marines including infantry and support person-
nel.
115. 18 U.S.C. § 825(d) (2) (2006).
116. See Victor Hansen, Changes in Modern Military Codes and the Role of the Military
Commander: What Should the United States Learn from this Revolution? (2007) (un-
published article), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article
=1000&context=victorhansen.
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argued for reducing the CA's power in the court-martial member
selection process, and indeed this was one of a handful of critical
reforms for the military justice system recommended by the First
Cox Commission, a blue ribbon commission tasked with studying
military justice ten years ago."'
Another question that has arisen is whether there should be ci-
vilian representation on courts-martial that try civilian accused.
The UCMJ currently protects enlisted members by giving them the
right to have at least one-third of the members of the panel be en-
listed."'8 This is presumed to be a protection provided to enlisted
members to prevent unfair discrimination by officers. Arguably a
similar protection should be afforded to a civilian tried by court-
martial. The concept of civilian representation on these types of
courts-martial finds support in a recent report of the Second Cox
Commission released in October 2009."' This report, while skepti-
cal of subjecting civilians to courts-martial in the first instance,
suggested that if such courts-martial were to be pursued against
civilians there should be a requirement to have civilians placed on
the court-martial panels in trials of civilians.2 o While I agree with
this suggestion in principle, it must be pointed out that such a
scheme would require significant changes to the UCMJ as well as
the Rules for Courts-Martial.
In addition to selecting the panel who sits on the accused's case,
the CA is also responsible for making the decision as to whether
there is sufficient evidence to refer the case to a court-martial.
Therefore, prosecutorial discretion within the military justice sys-
tem rests exclusively with the CA, and not with a trained attorney as
is the case in all other prosecutions in the United States. This con-
cern is tempered slightly because the UCMJ requires that the CA
be advised concerning the disposition of charges before a general
court-martial by a staff judge advocate (SJA)-an experienced, law
school-trained, and state bar certified military lawyer. 2' However,
the CA is free to reject the SJA's advice and proceed to prosecute
117. NAT'L INST. MILITARY JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE 50TH ANNI-
VERSARY OF THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARYJUSTICE 6-8 (2001).
118. U.S. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL R. 503(a) (2) (2008).
119. See NAT'L INST. MILITARYJUSTICE & AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 113.
120. Id. at 4.
121. U.S. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL R. 406. There are three levels of courts-
martial: summary, special, and general. A summary court-martial is the lowest level and has
been determined not to be a criminal conviction by the U.S. Supreme Court. A special
court-martial may order confinement for up to 12 months and roughly corresponds to a
misdemeanor-level civilian court. A general court-martial is the highest level military court,
roughly equivalent to a felony-level civilian court and may impose any punishment up to an
including life imprisonment without parole or death. See Uniform Code of Military Justice,
Pub. L. No. 81-506, Art. 16-20, 64 Stat. 107, 113-14 (1950).
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or dismiss the charges even if that decision is contrary to the SJA's
recommendation.122
C. The Unique Role of the Commander in the
Military Justice System
Moreover, use of the UCMJ is problematic because the military
commander occupies a unique role in a unique criminal justice
system. In the armed forces, the criminal process is inextricably
intertwined with the leadership and command function. In the
military justice system the decisions of how to proceed in a crimi-
nal case are made with respect to the potential impact on the unit's
morale, cohesion, good order, and discipline. In the case of a civil-
ian prosecuted under the UMCJ, although similar concerns may
arise, they are of a much different magnitude and immediacy.
The military commander's role is already quite demanding and
complex, and I submit that placing additional criminal justice re-
sponsibilities on a commander because of wholesale "outsourcing"
will further degrade the commander's focus from the mission. Fur-
ther, commanders may be even more distracted because this
change in the law will create criminal liability for a military com-
mander based on the misconduct over civilians serving under his
command. Although military commanders may currently be held
criminally responsible in certain instances for the acts of military
members under their command, they have much more control
and influence over those situations because of the training and
command structure in place in military units over military mem-
bers. Because such training and structure is largely nonexistent
with respect to civilians, the commander would have much less
control and influence over their actions. This was yet another con-
cern raised by the Second Cox Commission in its recently released
report. 1
The UCMJ is a criminal code, and convictions under the UCMJ
are federal convictions recognized by state and federal courts
throughout the country. Depending on the jurisdiction and the
potential maximum imprisonment authorized for the offense
under the UCMJ, a court-martial conviction may be treated as a
misdemeanor or felony by state courts in determining voting
rights, the right to possess firearms, and sexual offender status.2
122. U.S. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL R. 406.
123. See NAT'L INST. MILITARY JUSTICE & AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 113, at 4.
124. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-17(D) (2) (1978) (stating that a "prior felony con-
viction" means any prior felony "for which the person was convicted other than an offense
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Court-martial convictions are also used in sentencing guideline
schemes present in the federal and state systems which allow courts
to enhance punishment for past convictions. 25 In addition to these
concerns, no provision is made in the current UCMJ for a civilian's
right to appellate review if convicted under the UCMJ-yet anoth-
er point recommended for consideration by the Second Cox
Commission.'
D. The Differing Cultures and Attitudes of Military
and Civilian Personnel
Finally, we must bear in mind that military members and civil-
ians are markedly different in culture and attitude. Perceived pay
inequities between military members and contractors likely leads to
some degree of envy or even contempt for contractors by military
personnel.' 7 This resentment could help fuel bias against contrac-
tors, perhaps leading to disparate treatment for civilian contractors
in courts-martial. There is also the possibility of military CA's turn-
ing a blind eye to contractors because they are not responsible for
them in the same way that they are responsible for the military
members under their command.
V. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION: OVERSEAS
ARTICLE III COURTS
Congress should establish a system of permanently staffed extra-
territorial overseas courts. Establishment of such an overseas court
system has the potential to alleviate some of the major problems
that currently exist with both the MEJA and UCMJ approaches.
Moreover, the benefits of this proposal accrue to both the prosecu-
tion and the defense. Benefits to the prosecution would likely
include better access to witnesses and evidence, thus increasing the
triable by court martial"); ORE. REv. STAT. § 161.725(2)(c) (stating that a general court-
martial conviction must "also at the time of conviction of the instant crime [qualify as] a
felony if committed in [Oregon]"); State v. Mitchell 659 S.W2d 4, 6 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983)
(noting that the military justice system is "sufficiently foreign from our own system of crimi-
nal justice and from that of our sister states and federal government so as to prohibit its use
as a threshold predicate of enhanced punishment").
125. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4Al.2(g) (2009).
126. See NAT'L INST. MILITARY JUSTICE& AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 113, at 4.
127. A Blackwater contractor working in Iraq was making $30,000 per month, while a
private first class in the service was making $20,000 per year. See Pan, supra note 69; Basic
Pay: Active Duty Soldiers, GoARMY.COM, http://www.goarmy.com/benefits/money/basic-pay-
active-duty-soldiers.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2010).
[VOL. 44:1
The Case for Overseas Article III Courts
likelihood of successful prosecutions. Concomitantly, fundamental
criminal rights for the defense such as speedy trial, grand jury in-
dictment, and trial by jury would be preserved and strengthened.
A. Constitutional Authority for Establishment of Overseas Courts?
Congress has the power to establish such a court system pursu-
ant to Article I, Article III, or Article IV of the U.S. Constitution.
The President also arguably has the power to establish tribunals
under the "war and foreign relations powers" set forth in Article
II." However, for various reasons establishing a court system under
Article II seems the least promising.
The recent history of attempts to establish courts falling under
some assertion of Article II executive power includes mainly
unique event-driven situations. For example, in 1979 the executive
branch established the U.S. Court for Berlin to try East German
hijackers in Berlin when the West German government refused to
get involved for political reasons.' More recently, President
George W. Bush's initial attempt to set up the Guantanamo Bay
military commissions for the trial of alleged terrorists was ground-
ed in arguments of executive war powers to establish such
tribunals.'3 ' These experiences have taught that establishment of
tribunals by the executive branch, typically surrounded by due
process and separation of powers controversies, will undoubtedly
lead to challenges to the court's legitimacy. The hijacking case
tried in Berlin was fraught with difficulties including the alleged
attempts by other executive branch agencies to assert improper
influence over the proceeding.'3 ' And although Congress ultimate-
ly passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006 establishing the
Guantanamo Bay tribunals, this occurred only after the U.S. Su-
preme Court rejected Bush's attempts to establish them without
explicit Congressional authority.'3 3 Since the current political cli-
mate offers no hope of such a court establishing institutional
legitimacy, it seems that establishing such an Article II court would
be ill-advised.
128. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 65-66 (1982).
129. The Department ofJustice and Terrorism: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 107th
Cong. (2001) [hereinafter Terrorism Hearings] (statement of John Ashcroft, Att'y Gen. of the
United States).
130. See generally Maryellen Fullerton, Hijacking Trials Overseas: The Need for an Article III
Court, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1986).
131. Terrorism Hearings, supra note 129.
132. Fullerton, supra note 130, at 10-13.
133. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 635 (2006).
73FALL 2010]
74 University of Michigan journal of Law Reform
However, creation of similar courts under Article I has much
stronger historical and constitutional support. Article I courts may
be established by Congress pursuant to the power set forth in Arti-
cle I, Section 8 which provides as follows: "The Congress shall have
Power ... [t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court
,0134
Throughout the course of U.S. history Congress has established
a wide array of courts under its Article I powers.3 5 For example, the




U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
District of Columbia Judiciary, including the D.C. Court of
Appeals' 3 and the Superior Court of the District of Colum-
bial40
There are differences between establishing the proposed court
under Article I versus Article III-the significance of which varies
by perspective. Most obvious is the status of the judges who sit on
134. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
135. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 103-04 (1982)
(White, J., dissenting) (describing the types of possible Article I courts as characterized by
the plurality).
First, there are territorial courts, which need not satisfy Article III constraints because
the Framers intended that as to certain geographical areas ... Congress was to exer-
cise the general powers of government. Second, there are courts martial, which are
exempt from Art. III limits because of a constitutional grant of power that has been
historically understood as giving the political Branches of Government extraordinary
control over the precise subject matter at issue. Finally, there are those legislative
courts and administrative agencies that adjudicate cases involving public rights-
controversies between the Government and private parties-which are not covered by
Art. III because the controversy could have been resolved by the executive alone
withoutjudicial review.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
136. Established by Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172,83 Stat. 487 (1970).
137. Established by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549
(1978).
138. Established by The Uniform Code of Military Justice, Pub. L. No. 81-506, 64 Stat.
107 (1952).
139. Established by Act of Feb. 9, 1893, ch. 74, 27 Stat. 434.
140. Established by District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473.
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the court. Article III judges enjoy life tenure and their salaries may
not be reduced by Congress during their continuance in office.14 1
By contrast, Article I court judges typically are appointed by the
President and serve a fixed term of years.'4 2 The terms are typically
quite lengthy-examples being the term of a U.S. Bankruptcy
Court judge which is set at 14 years1' and the terms of U.S. Tax
Court and Court of Appeals for Armed Forces judges which are set
at 15 years.1 The degree of insulation from the political process
provided by life tenure seems to militate in favor of establishing
these courts as Article III courts. However, we must acknowledge
that the history of the District of Columbia courts establish prece-
dent for non-life tenure Article I judges overseeing extensive
functioning criminal courts, and there is no evidence that absence
of life tenure has prevented these judges from effectively perform-
ing their duties.1
The other significant difference seems to be that if the court is
established under Article III, the Constitution would require that
the accused be provided with the right to a jury trial.'4 1 In the cases
of courts established under Article I, there is no explicit constitu-
tional requirement for the right to be tried by a jury. However,
even if Congress were to establish an overseas Article I court
system, trial by jury would most likely be considered a minimum
constitutional protection in light of the Court's ruling in Reid.
Therefore, if the court must provide essentially the same due pro-
cess and procedural protections under either Article I or Article
III, the real question involves an assessment of the value of the
stronger theoretical independence of Article III judges. Although I
would argue that judicial independence and resulting institutional
legitimacy are sufficiently strong enough reasons to opt in favor of
Article III courts, I will concede that establishing this proposed sys-
tem under Article I is also theoretically possible. This general
proposition for the establishment of overseas courts is supported in
the scholarly literature by such commentators as Professor
Maryellen Fullerton who, more than twenty years ago, argued for
the establishment of overseas Article III courts to handle hijacking
141. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
142. Arthur John Keeffe & Ruth M. Wallick, Article III: Where Are You Now That We Need
You?, 62 A.BA. . 240 (1976) (discussing the District of Columbia Court Reorganization and
Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, which established the DC court system with Article Ijudges
rather than Article III judges).
143. See 28 U.S.C. § 152 (2006).
144. See 26 U.S.C. § 7443 (2006); 10 U.S.C. § 942 (2006).
145. Keeffe & wallick, supra note 142.
146. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 3.
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cases.147 However, most recent scholarly attention has focused on
strengthening MEJA or subjecting civilians to courts-martial with
little focus on the inherent limitations to either approach. Alt-
hough I strongly oppose the extension of court-martial jurisdiction
to civilians, I applaud MEJA's extension of extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion. However, this is only a partial fix; true, lasting consistency and
justice will not be served without a more comprehensive approach
to the problems.
For the reasons stated above, the best approach is to create a
court under Article III, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution. This
Section provides in relevant part that " [t]he judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish."4
One question which comes to mind is whether Congress has the
constitutional power to establish an Article III court overseas. Noth-
ing in Article III appears to limit the power of Congress to establish
such an overseas tribunal. Of particular note is that Section 2,
Clause 3 of Article III, implicitly supports such overseas tribunals:
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall
be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the
said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not com-
mitted within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or
Places as the Congress may by Law have directed. 49
This clause specifically allows the trial to be at such place or
places as the Congress may by law direct and would appear to grant
Congress the authority to create a court system to address ongoing
criminal activity overseas that affects American interests. The text
of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which grants the
right to jury trial, however is somewhat ambiguous, but does not
seem to prohibit the trial of persons by overseas Article III courts.
This Amendment provides that
in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
147. See generally Fullerton, supra note 130.
148. U.S. CONsT. art III, § 1.
149. Id. § 2, cl. 3.
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to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.150
Although the Sixth Amendment makes reference to an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, Section 2, Clause 3 of Article III clearly contemplates
the trial of cases arising outside any particular state. Reading these
two sections together, the Constitution would seem to only require
trial by an impartial jury of the area under the control of the U.S.
government. Without a more explicit expression of intent by the
Framers to allow trials within the exclusive sovereign territory of
another nation, allowing trials to be conducted within areas con-
trolled by the U.S. government is presumptively the outer
permissible limit of the exercise of such jurisdiction.
B. Implementation of the Courts: Logistics and Locations
Assuming that the concept is constitutional, implementing such
a system raises many key questions, some of them institutional and
some of them logistical. I propose that Congress establish four
Overseas Federal Districts which conform to geographical regions
where there is already a significant U.S. military and diplomatic
presence. These districts would include the Overseas Federal Dis-
trict of Europe and the Balkans (UK, continental Europe, and the
Balkans), the Overseas Federal District of Africa and the Middle
East (Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey and all of Af-
rica), the Overseas Federal District for the Far East (Japan, Korea,
China, Thailand, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Australia), and the
Overseas Federal District for South and Central America (all coun-
tries in the Western Hemisphere from Mexico south).
Once the Overseas Federal Districts are established, Congress
may authorize the President to appoint Article III judges to fill the-
se vacancies, along with the appropriation of funds for the
establishment of a support staff and courtroom facilities. Federal
judges appointed to a specific district would "ride a circuit," alter-
nating between the various geographic locations within his or her
district on a fixed schedule or on an "as-needed" basis. For exam-
ple, the judge appointed to the Overseas Federal District of Africa
and the Middle East could alternate between Iraq, Afghanistan,
Turkey, and any other location within the district that would
150. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
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require a sitting judge. Congress would need to allocate money for
the establishment of a full complement of staff for the court in-
cluding pretrial services, probation officers, and defense counsel.
Personnel could be hired or reassigned from these currently exist-
ing agencies to fill the vacancies that would be created. U.S.
Marshals Service special agents could be detailed to provide securi-
ty and prisoner management services.
C. The Problem of the Jury System in Overseas Federal Districts
One of the biggest challenges is the establishment of a viable ju-
ry system within the newly created Overseas Federal Districts. The
Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 established the qualifica-
tions for jurors in federal cases.' Essentially, jurors must be U.S.
citizens, have resided in the district for at least one year, meet min-
imum literacy requirements, and be fluent in English.'m They must
also be mentally and physically capable of service and free from
pending charges or convictions of crimes punishable by imprison-
ment for more than two years.52 I propose the jury be drawn from
civilians assigned to the bases and U.S. enclaves throughout the
particular Overseas Federal District. In light of the requirement of
one year of residency in the district, I would recommend that Con-
gress amend 28 U.S.C. § 2865 to allow an exception to the one year
residency requirement for cases prosecuted in the Overseas Feder-
al District Courts. Due to the relatively high turnover of personnel
in these overseas districts,154 it seems more reasonable to require
them to have resided in the Overseas Federal District for three
months instead of one year."'
One challenge that might be mounted is that selection of jurors
from a limited pool would be a violation of the defendant's right to
a jury drawn from a cross-section of the community. In Taylor v.
Louisiana, the Court applied the principle that although a defend-
ant is not entitled to a jury of any particular composition, the jury
wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which the juries are
151. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1878 (2006).
152. Id. § 1865.
153. Id.
154. See Kristen Hayes, Halliburton Keeps Its Civilian Employees in Iraq in Contact with Home,
N. COUNTY TIMES (Apr. 19, 2004 12:00 AM), http://www.nctimes.com/business/
article_54dbl8al-7256-5d64-946b-638be7d20b93.html.
155. The turnover rate is exceedingly high-with most contractors staying in Iraq for
one year or less. See id However, there are a relatively large number of contractors who have
been to Iraq on multiple occasions, which would cumulatively exceed one year.
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drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the communi-
ty.5 The Court clearly emphasized this by stating:
It should also be emphasized that in holding that petit juries
must be drawn from a source fairly representative of the
community we impose no requirement that petit juries actual-
ly chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various
distinctive groups in the population. Defendants are not enti-
tled to a jury of any particular composition ... .1
So long as the proposed court establishes a method of selecting
the venire that does not systematically exclude certain classes and
allows selection of jurors from the available U.S. citizens within the
Overseas Federal District, this proposal seems to be within the
Sixth Amendment's requirement for an impartial jury for the crim-
inal defendant.
D. Location and the Problem ofFinding Appropriate Counsel
If Congress were to authorize the establishment of an overseas
court system, an important issue to be addressed would be the
physical location of the court while in session. There are many op-
tions with respect to where the court might be held. U.S. military
bases or compounds, the U.S. Embassies, or any suitable secure
location within the country would be logical choices. In most cases
it would make the most sense to have the cases heard on military
bases because they usually provide both the facilities and security
necessary for judicial proceedings. However, if suitable military or
other U.S. government enclaves are unavailable, negotiations with
the host country could produce otherwise satisfactory locations.
Proximity to U.S. bases overseas would also likely reduce costs by
providing a sizable pool of qualified attorneys who could be depu-
tized to serve as special assistant U.S. attorneys (SAUSAs) in the
overseas court proceedings. For decades the DOJ has appointed
military judge advocates (JAGs) to prosecute crimes committed by
civilians on military installations in the United States."" The SAUSA
program is popular with both the DOJ and the service JAGs. Since
it reduces the workload on the DOJ's AUSAs while giving military
attorneys experience in federal court, both organizations enjoy
156. 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975).
157. Id.
158. See 32 C.F.R. 516.4(e) (2009) (discussing the responsibilities for JAGs who are ap-
pointed as SAUSAs).
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considerable benefits. Such a deputization program should work
just as well for cases prosecuted in the proposed overseas Article III
courts.
Similarly, military defense counsel might be assigned as counsel
for civilian accused. All military defense counsel are members of a
state bar and have been certified by the services as qualified to rep-
resent accused in criminal cases."59 For those civilians who cannot
otherwise afford counsel, the availability of qualified military coun-
sel could provide an immense benefit. At a minimum such military
counsel could provide assistance until retained civilian counsel
could arrive from the United States to represent the civilian ac-
cused. I would also suggest that in conjunction with creating the
overseas Article III courts that Congress also create an organization
to arrange for and help fund the costs of attorneys for civilians
prosecuted in the overseas courts.
VI. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED
OVERSEAS ARTICLE III COURT
There are many possible criticisms of my proposal. I will address
what I believe to be the most valid ones. I concede that host na-
tions could view the establishment of such a court system within
their territorial borders as an infringement on their sovereignty. In
many areas where these courts would likely function, Afghanistan
for example, there is no effectively functioning court system (or
government for that matter), so establishment of this court system
would be unlikely to generate much opposition. In other more sta-
ble countries, the compelling reasons for the establishment of such
a court seem to be diminished. At any rate, I submit that the Unit-
ed States establish this regime through treaty negotiations with
host countries. These usually arise through status of forces agree-
ments.16' There are certainly incentives for host nations in such
negotiations, not the least of which are conservation of both judi-
cial and governmental resources.
159. For the qualifications of military defense counsel, see U.S. MANUAL FOR COURTS-
MARTIAL R. 502(d)(1).
160. A Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is an agreement between a country and a
foreign nation stationing military forces within that country. These agreements generally
establish the framework under which foreign military personnel operate in a foreign coun-
try, addressing how the domestic laws of the foreign jurisdiction shall be applied toward
foreign personnel while in that country. See R. CHUCK MASON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT (SOFA): WHAT IS IT, AND How HAS IT BEEN UTI-
LIZED? 1 (2009).
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Some may argue that we should follow the example of our re-
cently negotiated status of forces agreement with Iraq.'6 1 Until
recently, U.S. forces and civilian contractors were not subject to
criminal jurisdiction by Iraqi courts. Paul Bremer, the first head of
the Coalition Provisional Authority, issued a memorandum estab-
lishing criminal immunity for all U.S. personnel from prosecution
by Iraqi courts.16' However, the recently approved Iraq-U.S. Accord
allows Iraqi courts to exercise criminal jurisdiction over U.S. ser-
vice members and other U.S. citizens in certain "serious" cases.
In my opinion, no U.S. citizens involved in nation-building as part
of the U.S. government's mission there should be subject to Iraqi
criminal jurisdiction because of the unstable and immature state of
the current Iraqi criminal courts system.'" The Iraqi criminal jus-
tice system is notoriously corrupt and fails to provide minimal due
process. In the words of a recent Human Rights Watch report, "the
court has failed to provide basic assurances of fairness, undermin-
ing the concept of a national justice system serving the rule of
law."165 The same holds true for many other countries where civil-
ian employees, dependants, and contractors of the U.S.
government go.'" While we should strive mightily to hold
employees, dependents, and contractors of the U.S. government
accountable, we should also be diligent in ensuring that they are
only subjected to possible punishment in a fair, mature criminal
justice system.
Another obvious criticism in the current fiscal climate is cost.
There would be substantial costs associated with manning and
equipping a new federal court system." Inefficiency is another
concern. Some would argue that there are not sufficient numbers
of individuals who fall into the gap to make it worthwhile. It seems
that this is not quite correct. In addition to the burgeoning ranks
of contractors, there are dependent husbands and wives of service
161. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the
Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities Dur-
ing Their Temporary Presence in Iraq, U.S.-Iraq, Nov. 17, 2008 [hereinafter Status of Forces
Agreement].
162. See Coalition Provisional Auth. Order No. 17, supra note 3, § 4,1 3.
163. See Status of Forces Agreement, supra note 161.
164. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE QUALITY OF JUSTICE: FAILINGS OF IRAQ'S CENTRAL
CRIMINAL COURT 12-13 (2008) (discussing the reasons for the current dismal state of Af-
ghanistan's legal system, and describing it as "highly ineffective and dysfunctional; it does
not operate as a system at all").
165. Id. at 1.
166. See Ali Wardak, Building a Post-Warjustice System in Afghanistan, 41 CRIME, L. & Soc.
CHANGE 319 (2004).
167. Although cost estimates on my proposal are not currently completed, I expect to
have them available by the time the Article goes to press.
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members, civilian employees of other federal agencies, and DoD
schools personnel to name only a few of the categories. In total,
there are thousands of individuals living and working in the region
encompassing the Middle East alone.
A final criticism is that accused in overseas Article III courts will
not be able to obtain effective representation due to their location.
While this concern is valid, as mentioned above, there are several
possible remedies, including the use of military defense counsel in
the area to provide representation. In addition, as part of the pro-
posal for overseas courts, I would recommend that Congress also
could create an organization to assist civilian accused in obtaining
counsel and to further facilitate the logistics and travel issues that
will likely arise. By providing these resources, it is likely that coun-
sel will be sufficiently available to represent the accused in these
overseas courts.
CONCLUSION
The United States has a moral responsibility to both protect and
treat civilian employees and contractors of the U.S. government
fairly, but there is an important responsibility to hold them ac-
countable for criminal actions as well. This is particularly
important when the United States is engaged in regime change,
nation-building, and the establishment of the Rule of Law in other
countries. Until the problems identified are corrected by reasona-
ble reforms like those suggested in this Article, the United States
will have difficulty making progress in many of these challenging
areas.
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